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Abstract: Climate change is the alteration of climate directly or indirectly caused by human activities that modify the composition of 
the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases (GHG), particularly CO2, are accumulating in the atmosphere, with the consequent warming. 
Global mean temperature has risen since preindustrial times, with most of the warming occurring in the last three decades. The 
consequence are increasingly frequent extreme weather events.  
Though economists have often disagreed about economic aspects of global warming, views as those of the Stern Review—that 
purports global warming as a major economic problem implying risks of disaster and demanding the use of major resources— are 
increasingly common. The idea that with development and technological progress total GHG emissions or at least emissions per capita 
would decrease has been discredited by evidence of a link between increased economic activity and greater emissions. In general, 
global emissions of CO2 have increased at rates correlated with the annual increase of world GDP (WGDP). Furthermore, the annual 
increase in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 is correlated with the growth of WGDP.  
Impacts of climate change and strategies to mitigate them have been often subjected to integrated assessment models (IAMs), 
which involve many controversial aspects. For global warming above 2 or 3 °C IAMs agree that there will be a reduction of long-term 
social well-being and a negative impact suffered mostly by low-income regions, but different IAMs strongly disagree on the level of 
human-induced damage, with estimates ranging from less than 1% to over 10% of WGDP. However, significant economic and 
technological potentials for mitigation and emissions reductions are now available. These would be larger if non-technical options 
(changes in consumption models and lifestyles) are also considered.  
Direct emissions of GHG related to agriculture are mainly emissions of CH4 and NO2. Indirect emissions of GHG from agricul-
ture include large CO2 emissions from land use change, when natural ecosystems are transformed into cultivated land. The sum of 
direct and indirect emissions may represent annually ¼ of GHG global emissions, with about ¾ of GHG agricultural emissions 
coming from low-income countries. Global warming impacts on agriculture include decreased yields in warmer environments, 
increased yields in colder ones due to longer growing season and CO2 fertilization (that perhaps could be offset by ozone emissions), 
more insect outbreaks and risk of wildfires, crop damage, and land and water degradation. Mitigation measures focused in soil carbon 
sequestration by modifying practices of intensive agriculture and moving towards agroecology or low-carbon agriculture are needed. 
Permits trading and the implementation of a carbon tax are the major options in the public debate about policies to mitigate cli-
mate change by reducing emissions. The European Trading Scheme (ETS) implemented in 2005 has yielded very poor results, failing 
to reduce emissions and with the emissions market presently inactive, with a price of emissions at almost zero. A carbon tax would 
reduce emissions by discouraging consumption of “carbon-rich” commodities and therefore promoting recycling, reusing and 
innovation toward production and consumption of “carbon-poor” commodities, but there have been only some timid steps to 
implement such a tax in some countries, and there is strong opposition to it 
 
1. Introduction 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change 
as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability ob-
served over comparable time periods." Using this definition of climate change, a joint statement of 
several science academies stated that in spite of uncertainties about something as complex as 
world's climate, there is now strong evidence that significant global warming is occurring (National 
Academies, 2005). The scientific consensus—backed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), the World Meteorological Organization, and a variety of scientific organizations and 
national academies—is that the process of global warming is attributed to anthropogenic influence, 
i.e., to gases emitted to the atmosphere because of industrial, agricultural, transport and other types 
of human activity (National Academies, 2005). The so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs) increase the 
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capture of solar radiation by allowing less infrared radiation from the sun to be deflected back to the 
outer space. Climate change is related to a number of GHGs, including halocarbons, nitrous oxide 
(N2O), methane (CH4), and carbon dioxide (CO2), but the consensus in the geosciences community 
is that CO2 is the most important GHG, and as such increasing atmospheric levels of CO2 represent 
the key factor to understand and explain global warming (Solomon et al., 2007). 
 Deforestation and other changes in the uses of soil are important determinants of climate 
change, because they modify the degree to which vegetation growth captures CO2. In fact, the 
monthly mean concentrations of atmospheric CO2 measured on the Hawaiian volcano Mauna Loa 
since March 1958 (the so-called Keeling curve) reveal a rising trend across quite a regular oscillating 
seasonal pattern (Figure 1), which is caused by differences in the ability of photosynthesis and 
respiration of the terrestrial biosphere and other sinks of CO2 to absorb the gas through the annual 
seasonal cycle (Conway et al., 1994). Atmospheric concentrations of CO2, now approaching levels of 
400 mg kg-1 (or parts per million, ppm), were at levels below 300 mg kg-1 in preindustrial times.  
 As a consequence of the greenhouse effect, global mean temperatures have increased 7 or 8 
tenths of 1 oC since 1900, with most of this increase occurring in the last three decades (Smith, 
2008; Menne et al., 2009). This increase of less than 1 oC in mean annual global temperature seems 
small compared with natural variability. However, this apparently small shift in the mean tempera-
ture is associated with more frequent extreme weather events, such as heat waves, droughts, torna-
dos, heavy rains, and storms. Taking as reference the period 1950-1980, during the past several 
years the portion of global land where summer temperatures have been more than three standard 
deviations (3σ) above the mean, has averaged 10%, when it should have been only 0.1% or 0.2% if 
the climatology of 1950-1980 had still prevailed (Hansen et al., 2012a). Examples of temperature 
anomalies exceeding 3σ are the heat waves and droughts that in 2010 covered much of the Middle 
East, Western Asia and Eastern Europe, and in 2011 Oklahoma, Texas and Mexico. Analyzing the 
variability of global temperatures since 1911, Rahmstorf and Coumou (2011) concluded that “given 
the strong evidence that most of the warming of the past 50 years is anthropogenic, most of the 
recent extremes in monthly or annual temperature data would probably not have occurred without 
human influence on climate.” The rapid loss of mass of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets in 
recent years (Velicogna, 2009, Rignot et al., 2011) is also evidence of atmospheric and ocean warm-
ing. 
 Assuming the continuation of the observed patterns of warming and the causes that produce 
them, the increase in global temperature will accelerate the retreat of glaciers and sea ice, and the 
changes in patterns of precipitation. An expansion of subtropical deserts, the extinction of large 
number of species and, eventually, a significant rise in ocean levels are to be expected (Lu et al., 
2007). Changes in crop yields are also part of the process of climate change. Considering potential 
interactions, an increase of global temperature of 4 °C above preindustrial levels would imply that 
the limits for human adaptation will be exceeded in many regions, while the limits of adaptation for 
natural systems would largely be exceeded throughout the world and the ecosystem services upon 
which human livelihoods depend would not be preserved (Warren, 2011). 
 This chapter discusses climate change focusing on economic factors and implications, and more 
concretely, the relation between economic growth and global warming that can be inferred from the 
available data. 
 
2. Economics and climate change 
Economists have been quite divided on their views on climate change since global warming became 
an issue of social and political debate in the 1980s. Many economists agreed with views that mini-
mized the importance of global warming or rejected proposed policies to prevent or reduce climate 
change for not being cost-efficient. In the last two decades, there have been strong disagreements 
among economists on the relation between economic growth and CO2 emissions, on the implica-
tions of global warming for human welfare and on the policies to prevent climate change (Holtz-
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Eakin and Selden, 1995; Spash, 2002; McCormick, 2004; Stern, 2006; Nordhaus, 2008; Krugman, 
2011).  
 In 2004, as part of the so-called Copenhagen Consensus, a panel of well-known economists, 
including five recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences concluded that policies 
that had been proposed to prevent global warming—for instance, in the Kyoto protocol—had “costs 
that were likely to exceed the benefits.” The panel agreed that global warming was an issue to be 
addressed—though much less important than other problems—and concluded that approaches 
based on “too abrupt a shift toward lower emissions of carbon” would be needlessly expensive 
(Lomborg, 2004). Continuing with a position that played down the importance of global warming, 
the panel of leading economists—slightly changed—in the Copenhagen Consensus 2008 and 2009 
argued for research on technological fixes for global warming. Investigation on low-carbon energy 
technologies was, however, ranked 14th among research priorities, after research on malaria and on 
acute management of heart attacks (Copenhagen Consensus, 2012). These views of the Copenhagen 
Consensus contrast not only with those of many natural scientists but also with the position of other 
well-known economists who have referred to climate change as a major problem to be tackled with 
urgency and by investing major resources (Adam, 2009; Krugman, 2011; Stern, 2011). 
 A common hypothesis in economic theorizing on global warming has been that the relation 
between economic growth, air pollutants in general, and CO2 in particular, has the shape of an 
inverted U, the EKC or environmental Kuznets curve (Nakicenovic, 1996; Schmalensee et al., 1998; 
Sun and Meristo, 1999). If CO2 emissions followed an EKC, they would first increase and then 
decrease with the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP). However, other economists could 
not find any evidence in favor of the EKC for CO2. Thus the hypothesis has been disputed on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds (Ekins, 1997; de Bruyn et al., 1998; Stern and Common, 2001; 
Stern, 2004; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005; Müller-Fürstenberger and Wagner, 2007; Wagner, 
2008).  
 Estimates of CO2 global emissions growing at increasingly faster annual rates since the 1980s 
(Raupach et al., 2007; Le Quéré et al., 2009) are quite inconsistent with an EKC for CO2. In fact, the 
growth of emissions since 2000 has been greater than for the most fossil-fuel-intensive emissions 
scenarios developed in the late 1990s by the IPCC. At both the national and the global level, evi-
dence is mounting on the link between increased production of goods and services and growth of 
GHG emissions, CO2 in particular (Roca and Alcántara, 2001; Quadrelli and Peterson, 2007; 
Raupach et al., 2007; Tol et al., 2009). With evidence in favor of an EKC for CO2 largely disputed 
and with emissions increasing in recent years, the emerging consensus seems to be that the curve is 
shaped as an N rather than as an inverted U (de Bruyn et al., 1998; Dinda et al., 2004; Martinez-
Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho, 2004). Almost without exception economic activity involves 
energy inputs and CO2-generating combustion is the primary source of energy in the modern world. 
For this reason, the hypotheses that the global intensity of economic activity is strongly correlated 
(i) with the volume of annual CO2 emissions, and (ii) with the rate of annual increase in CO2 atmos-
pheric concentrations, seem both plausible. There is evidence supporting both. 
 
2.1. Economic growth and CO2 emissions 
Both total and per capita CO2 emissions have generally been growing in all countries during the 20th 
century (Raupach et al., 2007), but across the long-term growth of emissions, there have been many 
short-term fluctuations. Since the prevention of global warming centres around policies to reduce 
CO2 emissions, it seems interesting to ascertain in what countries and in what periods emissions 
decreased during the years for which emission estimates are available. For that purpose, starting 
with the 48 nations that had population over 20 million at the end of the 20th century, and smooth-
ing the curves of total emissions with a 5-year centered moving average, we computed the mean 
annual rate of trend growth for each quinquennium of the period 1950-1999. Considering these 
rates, the countries in which emissions decreased were the following (in parenthesis is the rate of 
decline of emissions during the 5-year period): 
 4 
• in 1950-1954, none; in 1955-1959, Morocco (0.9), Venezuela (0.7), and Zaire (3.4); 
• in 1960-1964, China (4.7), and Zaire (1.7); in 1965-1969, Egypt (1.6); 
• in 1970-1974, Ethiopia (3.4), Uganda (3.6), United Kingdom (0.7), and Venezuela (0.6); in 1975-
1979, West Germany (0.3), France (0.2), Iran (0.9), Sudan (4.2), Uganda (8.4), United Kingdom 
(0.7), Tanzania (3.4), and Viet Nam (2.2); 
• in 1980-1984, Argentina (0.1), Canada (1.0), West Germany (1.7), France (3.9), Italy (0.7), Japan 
(0.3), Kenya (4.1), Peru (1.4), Philippines (2.3), Spain (1.2), United Kingdom (1.2), and United 
States (0.7); in 1985-1989, Afghanistan (3.9), West Germany (0.2), France (0.6), Myanmar (4.5), 
Nigeria (3.8), Poland (2.9), Romania (3.0), Tanzania (0.1), Viet Nam (0.2), and Yugoslavia (0.3); 
• in 1990-1994, Afghanistan (9.7), France (0.6), Nigeria (3.7), Poland (1.6), Romania (5.9), Sudan 
(2.4), United Kingdom (1.3), Zaire (6.0); in 1995-1999 Afghanistan (6.3), China (0.5), Colombia 
(1.5), North Korea (14.2), Germany (0.8), Poland (2.4), Romania (4.7), Russian Federation (1.7), 
Saudi Arabia (1.7), Ukraine (5.2), and Tanzania (0.6). 
 The pattern is very suggestive of decreasing CO2 emissions during periods of weak economic 
growth and of rising CO2 emissions during expansions. There were very few countries in which 
emissions declined in the 1950s-1960s; one was China where emissions declined in 1960-1964. All 
this is highly consistent with the fact that in the 1950s-1960s the world economy grew at very fast 
rates (Maddison, 2001); and in China the early 1960s were a period of strenuous economic restruc-
turing after an extreme disruption of the economy in 1960, during the so-called Great Leap Forward 
(Zhang and Fan, 2003). Things changed in the 1970s when emissions started to fall in many more 
countries, including high income countries, such as the United Kingdom, where emissions declined 
in 1970-1974, in 1975-1979, in 1980-1984 and again in 1990-1994. In each of the quinquennia of the 
1980s and 1990s, about a dozen countries had negative growth of emissions. While in the 1950s-
1960s, emissions decreased in just a handful of low-income economies, in the 1980s emissions 
decreased in the USA, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and other high-income coun-
tries. This occurred probably as a consequence of the declines in economic activity that occurred 
during this decade, the policies of energy saving and efficiency implemented as a response to rising 
petroleum prices and the oil-embargo triggered by the Yom-Kippur war, and the deindustrialization 
processes at work in high-income countries, such as the United Kingdom and others.  During the 
late 1980s, in Eastern Europe and the nations formerly part of the USSR, sudden political changes 
ushered in a period of economic transition from central planning to liberalized markets, and in the 
1990s, there were major disruptions of economic activity with skyrocketing unemployment and 
significant increases in poverty and adult mortality (Stillman, 2006). At the same time, CO2 emis-
sions greatly declined. For instance, in Romania, emissions dropped >5% per year throughout the 
1990s; and in Ukraine 5.2% per year in the late 1990s. In comparison, in the early 1980s, CO2 
emissions had dropped a little over 1% per year in the United Kingdom and a little below 1% in the 
USA.  
 We also determined the years and countries, among the nations with population more than 20 
million in 2000, in which the annual growth of emissions, total or per capita, was high or low since 
the 1920s to the present. With very few exceptions, total emissions decreased in the early 1930s 
(results not shown), the time of the Great Depression that affected most market economies world-
wide. Contrarily, strong and sustained annual increases—>4%—in total emissions are particularly 
concentrated in the 1920s, and the 1950s-1960s. In the 1950s-1960s, there were also large increases 
in per capita emissions. In many countries, both total and per capita emissions increased >4% per 
year in the most recent decades. 
 Considering the U.S. economy, its annual rate of growth and the rate of increase of U.S. emis-
sions of CO2 follow each other quite closely. Emissions dropped strongly in the recession of the early 
1920s, but they dropped much more lastingly and deeply during the Great Depression in the early 
1930s, and again in the recessions of 1938, 1949, the mid-1970s, and the early-1980s. The correla-
tion of the rate of growth of emissions with the rate of growth of real GDP (both are stationary 
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series, no spurious correlation is involved) is 0.53 (P < 0.0001) for the 1801-2002 period and is also 
strongly positive for all the sub-periods of these two centuries. Examining the correlation between 
year-to-year rates of growth of GDP and emissions during the four consecutive half-centuries 
between 1800 and 2000 (Table 1), it seems that the link between economic growth and growth of 
CO2 emissions strengthened with the passage of time, because the correlation went up in each 
consecutive 50-year period, from 0.37 (P < 0.01) in the first half of the 19th century to 0.74 
(P < 0.0001) in 1950-1999. These correlations indicate that CO2 emissions are what economists 
refer to as a procyclical variable, that is, a variable that moves in parallel with the business cycle, 
rising in periods of economic upturn and declining in periods of economic downturn.  
 In high-income countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany, the plots of per 
capita emissions versus per capita GDP (Figure 2) seem to suggest a delinking of GDP growth and 
growth in emissions, because in the most recent decades, per capita emissions declined with rising 
per capita GDP. These cases seem consistent with an EKC as an inverted U for CO2. A possible 
explanation might be that a high level of development creates conditions for the decarbonization of 
the economy, by making both production and consumption uses of energy much more efficient. We 
believe that a much more likely explanation is, however, that in these countries, the industrial base 
was displaced by a service economy at the same time that nuclear energy became a major source of 
energy.3 But, regrettably, it is very unlikely that energy use and CO2 emissions implied by national 
consumption have actually been reduced in these countries. With globalisation and increased 
international trade the energy consumption and CO2 emissions associated with consumption in 
these countries have been displaced to the rest of the world, from which goods are then imported to 
a “clean” economy (Suri and Chapman, 1998; Taskin and Zaim, 2000; Le Quéré et al., 2009). 
Indeed, in countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the USA, increasing levels of emissions per 
capita are observed with increasing levels of GDP per capita (Figure 2), suggesting an N-shaped, 
rather than a U-inverted curve. In-high income countries, such as Italy or Japan, where the indus-
trial sector was still a major component of the economy in the late 20th century, it seems that 
international trade was not able to push the relation between economic growth and CO2 emissions 
downward to the right side of the EKC, and the connection between economy and emissions 
strengthened (Figure 2). 
 Global emissions of CO2 have increased at rates strongly correlated with the absolute growth of 
the global economy (Figure 3), as measured by the annual increase of “world GDP” (WGDP). 
Indeed, a major drop in the growth of estimated emissions occurred in 2009 as a consequence of 
the “Great Recession” that affected the global economy. However, even in 2009 when the global 
economy contracted 2.25%, global emissions did not decrease, they just ceased growing to start 
growing again next year when the world economy somewhat recovered. This shows how dependent 
on fossil fuels the world economy has become in recent years. In earlier recessions of the global 
economy—in the mid-1970, early-1980s, early-1990s and late-1990s—emissions not only decreased 
in many countries, as we have shown, but also worldwide (Figure 3). 
 The notion that economic growth will reduce the carbon intensity of the world economy (the 
ratio of global emissions to WGDP) is inconsistent with the fact that the carbon intensity of the 
global economy has increased in recent years. In 2010, after the Great Recession, WGDP grew 5.0%, 
but emissions grew faster, 5.9%. Furthermore, the average growth of global CO2 emissions was 3.1% 
per year in 2000-2011, while it had been 1.0% per year in 1990–2000, and 2.0% per year in 1980-
1990 (Peters et al., 2012). 
 In summary, what the historical evidence indicates is that drops in total emissions occur when 
there is a contraction of the economy, as happened in the West in the 1930s and the 1980s, in the 
East in the 1990s, and in the global economy in 2009. Similarly, in periods of accelerated global 
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economic growth, e.g., the 1950s, the 1960s, or the early years of the 21st century, emissions greatly 
increased. Neither in total emissions nor per capita CO2 emissions does the historical experience 
suggest that emissions stabilize or drop after some level of income per capita is reached. 
 
2.2. Economic growth and CO2 atmospheric levels 
Estimates of CO2 emissions are usually accepted in the research community and therefore it is to be 
assumed that they are considered more or less reliable. Emissions are computed from economic 
data on consumption, exports and imports of fossil fuels, and cement production. Because these 
data are also inputs to compute GDP estimates, correlations between both kinds of estimates could 
subject to similar estimation errors. Contrarily, CO2 atmospheric concentrations are not estimated 
but measured with high reliability. Therefore, a correlation of the rate of increase of atmospheric 
CO2 and the rate of growth of the global economy is stronger evidence that the world economy is 
linked with the build-up of the greenhouse effect and, therefore, with the process of global warming. 
 Proving a short-term link between WGDP growth and the increase in atmospheric CO2 is 
complicated by the fact that at an annual timeframe, CO2 concentrations are subject to the influence 
of two natural phenomena, volcanic activity and the quasi-periodic climatic pattern called El Niño 
Southern oscillation (ENSO). However, multivariate analysis of the influence of the world economy, 
volcanic activity and ENSO activity on CO2 levels allows us to show that the annual increase in 
atmospheric CO2 is significantly linked to the growth of the global economy (Tapia Granados et al., 
2012). Years of above-trend WGDP are years of greater rise in CO2 concentrations, and similarly, 
years of below-trend WGDP are years of smaller rise in CO2 concentrations. 
 A link between (a) the volume of global economic activity, measured roughly by national GDPs 
that add up to WGDP, (b) worldwide emissions of CO2, and, consequently, (c) atmospheric levels of 
CO2 would be based on the known fact that most activities generating added value to WGDP also 
imply combustions (Chandr Jaunky, 2011). It is true that in many countries a sizable fraction of 
GDP corresponds to the services sector that by itself generate less emission of CO2 than manufactur-
ing. However, these service activities often involve the consumption of imported goods, which 
implies emissions in manufacturing in the exporting countries, and transportation—a major source 
of CO2. The increasing share of the services sector in GDP, the relocation of manufacturing to other 
countries, and the efficiency of reduced use of energy for concrete industrial or domestic activities 
may weaken the link between rising GDP and increasing CO2 emissions at the national level. How-
ever, increasing worldwide manufacturing, transport of raw materials, merchandise and people, and 
domestic use of energy will strengthen the link between global emissions and WGDP. Indeed, two 
thirds of the increase in the growth of CO2 concentrations during 2000–2007 has been attributed to 
increasing global economic activity (Canadell et al., 2007), and the physicochemical intensity of 
WGDP, measured either in estimated energy consumption per dollar, or in CO2 estimated emissions 
per dollar, increased during 2000–2005, reversing a decline before 2000 (Pielke et al., 2008). The 
conclusion is that “prosperity”—represented by greater levels of growth of national economies or the 
global economy—represents an escalation of the main cause of climate change.   
 
3. Monetary Valuation of Climate Change: Integrated Assessment Models 
Once the relation between economic growth and CO2 emissions and concentrations is understood, 
and the threats posed by climate change are realized, there are four possible options for society: (i) 
to do nothing and continue in the ‘business-as-usual scenario’; (ii) to adapt to the consequences of 
climate change; (iii) to reduce the emissions to curb the problem at its source; and (iv) to offset 
emissions—or rising temperatures—by increasing the absorptive capacity of CO2 sinks or other 
technical measures. In the climate change literature, the second strategy is commonly referred to as 
adaptation, the third as mitigation, and the fourth as geoengineering, or climate engineering. 
 We will discuss in this section the economic aspects of adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
Geoengineering for managing climate change, for instance, aiming to remove CO2 directly from the 
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air—e.g., through ocean fertilization—or to block sunlight to reduce atmospheric warming—has 
been mentioned in the economic literature (Barrett, 2008) and has been supported by celebrities 
(Vidal, 2012). According to the IPCC (2007a, p. 621), little is known about effectiveness, costs or 
potential side-effects of such unconventional options. We believe geoengineering for managing 
climate change poses major ethical and scientific problems and we will not discuss it here.  
 
3.1. Results of Integrated Assessment Models  
Strategies to mitigate climate change involve different types of costs and benefits (economic, social, 
and environmental). Some of them can be easily expressed in monetary terms. In other cases, 
however, monetization is very difficult. For more than two decades, economists have contributed 
proposal and analyses of these strategies. The objective would be to estimate in monetary terms the 
impacts associated with climate change, and assess the benefits and costs associated with different 
options to reduce emissions of GHG. 
 Because climate change is a multidimensional problem, it requires simultaneous consideration 
of multiple scientific fields. Thus, since the 1990s, integrated assessment models have been devel-
oped, combining information from different social and natural sciences to understand the interac-
tions between two complex systems: climate and society (Weyant et al., 1996; Pearce et al. 1996; 
Tol, 2000, 2009; Goodess et al., 2003; Courtois, 2004)  As defined by the IPCC, an integrated 
assessment model (IAM) is a convenient framework “for combining knowledge from a wide range of 
disciplines in order to conduct coordinated exploration of possible future trajectories of human and 
natural systems, development of insights into key questions of policy formation, and prioritisation 
of research needs in order to enhance our ability to identify robust policy options” (IPCC, 1996). In 
the so-called macroeconomics-oriented IAMs, the main focus is on economic impacts and the two 
main tools for assessment are cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. In the cost-
benefit analysis, the costs of climate change and the costs of control measures or mitigation are 
measured in the same monetary units and compared with the benefits of adopting these measures 
(i.e., environmental damage avoided). The purpose is to calculate the option that maximizes net 
benefits (the difference between benefits and costs). In cost-effectiveness analysis, a target is set 
(e.g., to reduce emissions, or to reach stability of atmospheric CO2 at a certain level) and the best 
control or mitigation option is selected by choosing the one with the lowest cost. In general, dam-
ages caused by climate change are defined as the difference in "social welfare" between a scenario 
with anthropogenic climate change and one without it. The variation of “social welfare” as a conse-
quence of the costs of climate change and the adoption of control and mitigation policies is usually 
measured as a percentage of GDP. Finally, it should be noted that macroeconomics-oriented IAMs 
rely on the optimization and equilibrium approach of neoclassical economics: welfare optimizing 
identical agents, the economy operating in equilibrium in competitive markets, with perfect infor-
mation, etc.4 When considering the world at large, the global IAM aggregates the macroeconomic 
and environmental variables of different countries into a single output, capital stock, technology, 
and emissions. 
 A review of IAMs developed during the last two decades reveals two IAM generations. The first 
generation of IAMs developed in the 1980s and early 1990s (see reviews in Pearce et al., 1996; Tol et 
al., 2000) assessed the effects of a doubling of atmospheric levels of CO2 from pre-industrial times 
with a consequent rise of 2.5 °C in temperature (Nordhaus , 1991; Ayres and Walters, 1991; Cline, 
1992; Titus, 1992; Fankhauser, 1995; Tol, 1995). In general, as illustrated in Table 2, this increase in 
temperature leads, in these models, to monetary costs ranging between 1% and 2% of WGDP, but 
with significant regional differences, because losses in developed countries would be between 1% 
and 1.5% of GDP, whereas in developing countries they would be between 2% and 9% of GDP. Thus, 
                                                 
4
 Neoclassical economics is the predominant theoretical approach in economics, but many economists do not subscribe 
its main tenets and feel closer to other schools (Austrian, institutionalist, Keynesian, post-Keynesian, Marxian, ecologi-
cal, etc.) of economics. 
 8 
according to these models, while developing countries, which are the least contributors to climate 
change, suffer the highest costs of global warming, wealthy countries, with greater responsibility for 
GHG emissions, show “better” results. 
 The IAMs of the first generation differ in the assumptions, categories of damage, and monetized 
impacts that were considered. For instance, while Nordhaus (1991) considered the impacts of 
climate change on activities such as agriculture, or energy production, or the rise in sea level, in 
other IAMs (Cline, 1992; Titus, 1992; Fankhauser, 1995; Tol, 1995), monetary estimates of non-
market human or environmental costs (human morbidity and mortality, air and water pollution, 
etc.) were included. In general, the assumption of a fixed increase in temperature (2.5 ºC) was a 
major limitation of the first generation IAMs, which therefore could not provide an assessment of 
the impacts of progressive increases in global temperature. The second generation IAMs (Mendel-
sohn et al., 1998, Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Tol, 2002; Stern, 2006) attempted to overcome this 
shortcoming. They, however, produced large inconsistencies in the impact estimates. For example, 
Mendelsohn et al. (1998) estimated the monetary value of the impact of climate change on five 
markets (agriculture, energy, forestry, water and coastal zones). This IAM, as the one authored by 
Tol (2002), predicted inequality of impacts between regions, concluding that an increase in global 
temperature between 1.2 and 3.5 °C taking place until 2100 would have a very slightly beneficial 
overall aggregate impact, increasing WGDP by some 0.2%. Contrarily, in the IAM by Nordhaus and 
Boyer (2000) estimated costs were between 1.5% and 2% of WGDP under the assumption of a 
doubling of CO2 levels with an increase of global temperatures of 2.5 °C in 2100. This IAM by 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) considered market and non-market impacts—in agriculture, other 
markets, sea-level rise, health, amenities, human settlements, and agricultural ecosystems—and was 
the first to provide cost estimates of the risk of catastrophe. Under the assumption of a temperature 
increase of 6 °C, implying catastrophic harm, the costs estimated by Nordhaus and Boyer rose to 7% 
of WGDP. 
 Despite differences in the impact categories covered, periods and scenarios considered, the 
results of different IAMs can be summarized as follows (Stern, 2006: 148): (1) For warming up to 2 
or 3 °C, some models predict beneficial, others harmful impacts, though in general any benefits are 
concentrated in rich countries, while costs of climate change fall particularly on poor countries. (2) 
For global warming above 2 or 3 °C, the models agree in the assessment that climate change would 
reduce long-term well-being, leading to lower levels of consumption and per capita income. Besides 
the consensus on the negative impact and the higher costs suffered by low-income regions (Africa 
and Asia), the models strongly disagree on the level of human-induced damage, with estimates 
ranging from less than 1% to >10% of WGDP. Even after standardizing assumptions and scenarios 
in different models, the range of variation in the results is very significant. For example, considering 
the U.S. economy, the standardization of assumptions in five IAMs resulted in estimates of climate 
change costs ranging from 0.4% to 2.2% of GDP (Spash 2002: 171). The IAMs have sometimes 
rendered contradictory results with respect to the same sector. For example, Chinese agriculture 
sometimes appeared as a major loser (Fankhauser, 1995), other times as a major winner (Nordhaus, 
1998) of climate change. 
 Discrepancies also occur when calculating the so-called "social cost of carbon," that is, the net 
present monetary value of damage caused by an additional increase in CO2 emissions. Under the 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, the marginal cost of the damage would be equivalent to a 
carbon tax that would internalize the externality posed by climate change and achieve an efficient 
solution. However, as documented by Tol (2008, 2009), there is great uncertainty in the estimated 
social cost of carbon. More than 50 studies, involving 200 different estimates, provide a mean 
estimate of $105 (U.S. dollars of 1995) per metric ton of carbon, with a standard deviation of $243, 
and a mode of only $13 (Tol 2009, p. 41). 
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3.2. Limitations of IAMs 
The lack of robustness of results of different IAMs indicates the limitations of the neoclassical 
approach, which constitutes the theoretical base of most IAMs; the variety of so-called ad hoc 
assumptions (often qualified as “heroic” by their own authors), and the controversial nature of the 
methods to estimate the monetary value of non-market costs and benefits (mortality, morbidity, 
damage to ecosystems, etc.). These features explain why many contributions of this type of macro-
economics-oriented IAMs have been criticized for their dubious political usefulness and limited 
scientific soundness (Spash, 2002; Courtois, 2004; Ackerman et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2009). 
Important shortcomings of IAMs are the following: 
 (1) Lack of transparency to explain and justify the assumptions behind the estimates. This 
weakness has been noted even by one of the most prolific authors in the development of IAMs (Tol, 
2002: p. 48). It is almost impossible to avoid value judgments in developing models for assessment 
of impact; at most, the value judgements are implicit. However, models are often built without any 
explicit ethical consideration, as if that would imply constructing them with scientifically proven 
facts only. 
 (2) Questionable treatment of uncertainty and discounting of the future. To compare costs or 
benefits from effects suffered or enjoyed by future generations requires using an appropriate 
discount rate for obtaining present values. Any positive discount rate implies that the welfare or 
interest of present generations weighs more in the decision than the welfare of future generations. 
In most IAMs, discount rates between 3% and 6% are used. The rationale is that future generations 
would benefit from economic growth and thus they would consume more goods and services and 
therefore obtain more utility. However, the available scientific information suggests that future 
problems of scarcity of resources and saturation of natural sinks are closely related to economic 
growth, which would be reaching limits imposed by natural resources and other natural variables. 
The likely consequences of climate change also worsen the environmental and social conditions for 
human existence. In this context, adopting the precautionary principle as a guide to minimize the 
worst future scenarios, indeed, seems to be the rational choice. A value judgment that assumes a 
positive discount rate is questionable, in particular because from an ethical point of view, only equal 
weight of all generations would be defensible, which means a zero discount rate. In any case, simply 
by varying the discount rate of what an uncertain future holds, the results of IAMs are significantly 
modified.  As explained by Ackermann et al. (2009, p. 310), 
 
The upshot of these alternative ways of characterizing the intergenerational decision-making problem is that the 
normative assumptions that are made about how future generations are treated are as important as the technical 
details. Not having happened yet, the future is unobservable; moreover, there are no reliable, universally accepted 
economic laws that shape our understanding of the future in the way that the laws of natural science do for the 
physical reality of climate change. When it comes to economics, there is no escape from value-laden assumptions 
about the future. Furthermore, consciousness and intergenerational concern are influenced by social and political 
discourse. In the case of climate policy where fundamental values and ethical principles are at stake, it is an abdica-




 (3) Assumption of perfect substitutability between manufactured capital and “natural” capital 
in the production of goods and services. In IAM models, a basic assumption is that natural re-
sources, ecosystems, natural sinks or other elements of the so-called natural capital can be substi-
tuted by manufactured capital (machines, chemical procedures, etc.), so that reductions or exhaus-
tions in the stock of natural capital could be offset by increases in the stock of manufactured capital 
to keep intact the capacity of producing goods and services. Some ecological economists (Daly, 
1996; Neumayer, 1999, 2007) have shown how the relation between the two stocks of “capital” is 
one of complementariness, with possibilities of substitution being rare in most production proc-
esses. It does not help to expand a fleet of fishing boats to compensate for the disappearance of fish 
stocks. In the context of climate change, where anthropogenic processes imply a significant deterio-
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ration of the stocks of natural and manufactured capital, maintaining the assumption of perfect 
substitutability between them is a major limitation. 
 4) Finally, the way IAMs estimate monetary costs of non-market effects can lead to skepticism 
about policies based on the results of the models. The estimation of non-market values is supported 
in methods of “willingness to pay” (WTP) for desired items or “willingness to accept” (WTA) a 
compensation for undesired occurrences. These methods of WTP and WTA have theoretical weak-
nesses that are well known in ecological and environmental economics. For instance Tol (2009, p. 
39) has explained the difficulties of WTP and WTA methods in an intergenerational framework: 
 
Implicitly, the policy problem is phrased as: “How much are we willing to pay to buy an improved climate for our 
children?” Alternatively, the policy problem could be phrased as: “How much compensation should we pay our 
children for worsening their climate?” This question is a different one, and the answer would be different if future 
generations are loss averse or distinguish between self-imposed and other-imposed risks. 
 
 Beyond the ethical and practical problems implied by the estimates, it seems there is also a 
conceptual mistake: the fact that we give a value to the surrounding environment and to human 
lives does not mean that there is also a monetary expression of this value that valuation techniques 
aim to find. Though many economists assume anything can be rationally attributed a monetary 
value, many others question the valuation of all valuable things for individuals and society in 
money. Indeed, when in the IPCC's Second Assessment Report (Pearce et al., 1996) money values 
were attributed to the environment and human life, it immediately raised a hard scientific contro-
versy (Masood and Ochert, 1995; Meyer, 1995; Pearce, 1995; Tol, 1997; Spash, 2002). The global 
estimates of positive (beneficial) effects of climate change on social welfare obtained in some IAMs 
are the consequence of estimated welfare gains in rich countries, offsetting welfare losses in poor 
countries. This highlights the importance of how costs are calculated and the assumptions and 
methodologies used for it. As Ackerman et al. (2009, p. 305) have explained, 
 
Should we estimate the value of human life on the basis of the small wage differentials between more and less dan-
gerous jobs [...]? Or, should we rely on responses to long questionnaires asking people how much they would pay to 
avoid small risks of death under abstract hypothetical scenarios [...]? Should we value ecosystems according to what 
people living nearby report they are willing to pay to preserve their scenic vistas or their favourite large animals? A 
non-economist could be forgiven for assuming that these are rhetorical questions. Yet these approaches are regularly 
applied in policy analyses to estimate monetary values for health and environmental benefits […]. Should the value 
of a human life depend on individual or national income levels? Should nature located in a rich country be worth 
more than if it is located in a poor country? Remarkably, economists often answer “yes” to both of these disturbing 
questions. Values of human life differentiated by national income made a brief and unwelcome appearance in the 
IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (1996) but appeared to be banished by the time of the Third Assessment Report 
(2001). Similar values, however, continue to appear in the economics literature, making their way into IAMs... 
 
 The aforementioned limitations probably explain the growing skepticism of some economists 
and many scientists about the usefulness of IAMs. Unease is added to skepticism sometimes, as, for 
example, when an expert in IAMs of climate change, Robert Mendelsohn, wrote in 2000 a disturb-
ing letter in which he explained to Senator McCain “the facts” that with a global average warming of 
5 °C during the next century, the United States would enjoy benefits ranging between 14 and 23 
billion a year while damages would be only 13 billion (Courtois, 2004, p. 69). 
 In the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2006) that was released for 
the British government on October 2006, the effects of global warming on the world economy were 
comprehensively discussed. Although not the first economic report on climate change, the Stern 
Review has been considered the most widely known and discussed report of its kind. The authors of 
the review made a conscious attempt to overcome the weakness of previous IAMs, improving the 
understanding of uncertainty issues and addressing better the risk of catastrophic scenarios. In 
reviewing the literature, the Stern Review (p. 148) concluded that results of previous IAMs were 
heavily dependent  
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on how [the model] aggregates the impacts across regions, and in particular how it values costs in poor regions rela-
tive to those in rich ones. The prices of marketed goods and services, as well as the hypothetical values assigned to 
health and the environment, are typically higher in rich countries than in poor countries. Thus, in these models, a 
10% loss in the volume of production of an economic sector is worth more in a rich country than in a poor country. 
Similarly, a 5% increase in mortality, if ‘values of life’ are based on willingness to pay, is worth more in purely 
monetary terms in a rich country than a poor country, because incomes are higher in the former. Many ethical ob-
servers would reject both of these statements. 
 
 It is surprising, however, that these considerations are mostly overlooked when estimating the 
monetary costs of climate change, which in the Stern Review include both market and non-market 
costs related to health and the environment. Inconsistencies on these issues appear in the review, as 
illustrated by the following assertions (p. 145-146): 
 
Economists have developed a range of techniques for calculating prices and costing non-market impacts, but the 
resulting estimates are problematic in terms of concept, ethical framework, and practicalities. Many would argue 
that it is better to present costs in human lives and environmental quality side-by-side with income and consumption, 
rather than trying to summarise them in monetary terms. That is indeed the approach taken across most of the Re-
view. Nevertheless, modellers have tried to do their best to assess the full costs of climate change and the costs of 
avoiding it on a comparable basis, and thus make their best efforts to include ‘non-market’ impacts. 
 
 The contradictions and limitations of the Stern Review have been noted by ecological 
economists (Spash, 2007, Dietz et al. 2007; Neumayer, 2007) and to a great extent have been 
mentioned and even recognized by Stern himself. In any case, the main message of the Stern Review 
is that the overall costs, including market and non-market sectors, of climate change can be 
estimated to be between 5% and 20% of WGDP until 2050. But with appropriate policies and 
mitigation technologies, emissions could be reduced and atmospheric levels of CO2 stabilized at 450 
mg kg-1 with an investment equal to 1% of annual world GDP in the same period. 
 
3.3. Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies 
The uncertainty in the estimates of costs should not be an obstacle to address the problem and 
mitigate its consequences. During the last two decades there have been many proposals and debates 
on mitigation of climate change, that is, on how societies could reduce GHG emissions through 
economic policies and technological means. Research and proposals regarding possibilities of 
adaptation to climate change have been much less common. In general, adaptation measures aim to 
reduce the vulnerability of society to severe adverse climatic events (droughts, floods, etc.), while 
mitigation strategies seek to reduce human emissions of GHG. Hence, it can be said that mitigation 
intends to protect nature from society, while adaptation is intended to protect society from nature 
(Stehr and von Storch, 2005, p. 537). 
 Until very recently, societal adjustments to climate change have been mostly unplanned and 
forced by circumstances. There is often a relationship between increased vulnerability to climate 
change and a lower degree of economic and social development that implies a lower adaptive 
capacity. Social and economic consequences of weather phenomena are usually worst when they 
interact with social events, such as armed conflicts or epidemics, or chronic conditions of land 
degradation, poverty or lack of public sector institutions to deal with environmental emergencies 
related to global warming, e.g., droughts, hurricanes or wildfires. Though conditions that make 
adaptation more difficult often occur in ‘Third World’ regions and countries—e.g., drought-related 
impacts of global warming in Africa have been considered particularly damaging—high-income 
countries with better economic and social conditions have also suffered hard hits of extreme 
weather events that can be connected with climate change, e.g., hurricane Katrina in the USA in 
2005, and the heat waves and droughts that affected much of Europe in 2003, Eastern Europe in 
2010, and Mexico and the southern USA in 2011 (IPCC, 2007b, p. 56; Hansen et al., 2012b). 
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 Along with adaptations forced by circumstances, there may be planned adaptations to the effects 
of climate change. Some are documented in the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report; for instance, the 
partial drainage of the Tsho Rolpa glacial lake in Nepal, changes in livelihood strategies of the Inuit 
in response to the melt of permafrost in northern Canada, or the consideration of sea-level rise in 
the management of coastal zones in the USA or in the design of infrastructure, such as the Confed-
eration Bridge of Canada (Adger et al., 2007, p. 719). 
 Adaptation policies and measures include planning and management of natural resources 
(water and energy), influence in the operation of economic sectors (agriculture, construction and 
infrastructure), and reducing the direct impact of climate change on human health. Measures that 
have been proposed or applied are expanded rainwater harvesting and application of desalination 
techniques for improving water availability; adjustment of planting dates and crop variety, erosion 
control and soil protection through tree planting to prevent damages in agriculture; seawalls, storm 
surge barriers (e.g., mangroves), dune reinforcement and creation of marshlands/wetlands as 
buffers against sea level rise, flooding and erosion; and plans for preventing human deaths because 
of heat waves (IPCC, 2007b, p. 57). Of course, many of these measures and policies will only be 
useful to adapt or mitigate moderate climate disruption, implying small levels of warming or other 
alterations of the climate. 
 Cost-benefit analyses and analyses of cost-effectiveness have been applied sometimes in the 
adaptation field; they have been much more commonly applied to economic evaluations of mitiga-
tion strategies. Studies on adaptation strategies have focused primarily on adaptation to sea level 
rise (Fankhauser, 1995a; Yohe and Schlesinger, 1998, Tol et al., 2003, Ng and Mendelsohn 2005, 
Nicholls and Tol, 2006), and adaptation in agriculture (Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; Adams et al., 
2003, Reilly et al., 2003), primarily in the OECD countries (see a review in Adger et al., 2007). 
Taking into account the caveats on the theoretical weaknesses of these cost-benefit or cost-efficiency 
analyses that were explained in section 3.2, the results of these studies can be summarized as 
follows (Adger et al., 2007, pp. 724-725).  First, coastal protection is an optimal policy in almost all 
cases in which the rise in sea level is less than one meter. Second, there are significant uncertainties 
about monetary valuations of land. Third, in agriculture, the geographical and economic context 
seems to be essential: some adaptation measures of low cost in poor countries (tropical), such as 
changes in planting dates and crop mixes, have shown significant potential, but, by themselves, 
would not be able to offset the damage caused by climate change. 
 Mitigation strategies have received increased attention in academic and institutional spheres in 
recent years. As part of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Barker et al. (2007) reviewed 
mitigation studies as well as the potential of available technologies and technologies projected to be 
commercialized before 2030 for reducing GHG emissions. Table 3 contains a summary of the 
selected sectors and reduction potentials under different prices of one ton of CO2, applying a bot-
tom-up approach.5 Considering the selected sectors and estimated potential for mitigation, it shall 
be noted that: 
 (i) even without considerations or assumptions on the uncertain future, studies show the 
existence of pure benefit (negative costs) associated with mitigation measures that save economic 
resources and might reduce GHG emissions by 6 gigatons of CO2-equivalents6 in 2030; possibilities 
of such benefits are mainly in the areas of construction, electricity production, and energy consump-
tion in transport; 
                                                 
5
 According to the Glossary of Terms used in the IPCC Third Assessment Report, the terms ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ are 
“shorthand for aggregate and disaggregated models. The top-down label derives from how modelers applied [...] 
techniques to historical data on consumption,  prices, incomes, and factor costs to model final demand [...], and supply 
from main sectors, like the energy sector, transportation, agriculture, and industry. Therefore, top-down models evaluate 
the system from aggregate economic variables, as compared to bottom-up models that consider technological options or 
project-specific climate change mitigation policies.” 
6
 A gigaton equals 10
9
 tons. Emissions are estimated in CO2-equivalents to measure together emissions of different 
GHG. In the rest of the chapter Gt CO2-eq. is the abbreviation for gigatons of CO2-equivalents.    
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 (ii) there is also a broad consensus that no single technology option is able to provide all poten-
tial mitigation for each sector; and  
 (iii) these potentials for mitigation and emission reductions are supported only by technological 
progress, without incorporating the potential mitigation associated with non-technical options, such 
as changing consumption models and lifestyles. Changes in consumption patterns and lifestyles are 
particularly relevant, though. 
 Besides the reduction in annual emissions of 6 Gt CO2-eq that could be obtained in 2030 from 
mitigation measures that save economic resources, Barker et al. (2007, p. 621) estimated additional 
mitigation potentials in 2030 depending on different carbon prices. For prices of less than 50 US$ 
per ton of CO2-eq, the total reduction would be 13 to 26 Gt CO2-eq (this includes the aforemen-
tioned 6 Gt of reduction and would correspond to 29%-59% of global GHG emissions in 2005); for 
higher prices of 50 to 100 US$ per ton of CO2-eq, the mitigation potential would rise 16 to 31 Gt 
CO2-eq (equivalent to 36%-70% of global emissions in 2005). 
 Reaching these goals requires a combination of technological and sectoral policy options, 
including improvements in energy efficiency and fossil fuel reduction and substitution, land use and 
transport planning, efficient lighting, improved crop management and soil conservation, reforesta-
tion and sustainable forest management, etc. This should be developed in conjunction with appro-
priate incentive and disincentive mechanisms (subsidies for ecological reconstruction of economy, 
taxes on carbon, energy planning, financial incentives, etc.).  
 It is obvious that the potential for mitigation exists regardless of difficulties and weaknesses of 
the monetary quantification for it. But three considerations shall be added. First, the fact that after 
these mitigation estimates were performed, the global economy suffered a serious economic crisis, 
the so-called Great Recession, which poses serious questions about the realism of the rate of global 
economic growth assumed in most scenarios. As noted in section 2, the drop in WGDP implied by 
the Great Recession was accompanied by a momentary reduction in the growth rate of CO2 emis-
sions. Second, the excessive reliance on technology to address climate change often ignores one of 
the most important lessons learned from history of technological progress: the systematic appear-
ance of the “rebound effect” corresponding to the so-called Jevons paradox. This implies that more 
efficiency in the use of a resource does not reduce but tend to increase the use of the resource 
(Blake, 2005; Polimeni et al., 2008). In this regard, for example, although energy efficiency in the 
use of fossil fuels has improved in recent decades, CO2 emissions have not been declining but 
steadily increasing. Technological improvements increasing the efficiency of use of a resource tend 
to reduce the unit price of the resource and thus they tend to increase, rather than decrease, the 
quantity consumed. In this way, increasing efficiency in the use of something would tend to increase 
the overall physical consumption of it (and activities related), and therefore also the energy (emis-
sions) and materials used to produce it. In a peak oil scenario, that is, under the assumption that the 
highest possible rate of extraction of petroleum has been reached (the International Energy Agency 
says production of conventional crude oil peaked in 2006), the effect of the Jevons paradox could be 
very harmful, because it would keep the level of use of fossil fuels, and therefore rising or at least not 
declining CO2 emissions, in spite of rising prices of fossil fuels. 
 It seems clear that one route to mitigation that should be explored more systematically is what 
IPCC calls “non-technical options,” that is, changes in consumption patterns and lifestyles whose 
potential is not considered in the mitigation scenarios. For instance, there is increasing evidence of 
the importance of changes in patterns of individual mobility. For an identical volume of transport, 
public transportation, walking, or bicycling (or sea/land carriers instead of airborne vessels) saves 
emissions compared with car transportation. Many of these options have also large potentials as 
health-enhancing behaviors. 
 The conclusion is that these mitigation issues have to do with technology, but given the limita-
tions of technological fixes, it is necessary not to overlook the possibility of socio-economic changes 
to modify economic mechanisms and incentives to advance towards a world with a stable climate, 
compatible with justice and human progress. According to the IPCC, it can be expected with high 
 14 
confidence that even a combination of aggressive mitigation and significant investment in adaptive 
capacity could be overwhelmed by the end of the present century. Until around 2050, it is likely that 
global mitigation efforts designed to cap CO2 concentrations at 550 mg kg-1 would benefit develop-
ing countries significantly, and developed countries would also likely obtain significant benefits 
from an adaptation-mitigation intervention portfolio. However, by 2100, climate change will likely 
produce significant harm across the globe, even if aggressive mitigation strategies were imple-
mented in combination with significantly enhanced adaptive capacity (Yohe et al., 2007). 
 
4. Agriculture and climate change 
As economic development takes place, the contribution of agriculture to GDP strongly decreases. It 
is presently only a few percentage points in high-income countries, though much higher in the 
developing world (according to World Bank, 1.2% in 2010 in the USA, 17.2% in India). Leaving aside 
monetary measures, the sector is very important not only because it provides food for the human-
kind, but also because it provides work to 40% of the world's active population (FAO, 2011). In 
developing countries, the proportion working in agriculture is quite higher, up to a range of 60% to 
75%. 
 In recent decades, there have been major technological changes in agriculture, usually origi-
nated in developed countries and increasingly widespread worldwide through the “green revolu-
tion.” The following are some important characteristics of agriculture and the global system of food 
production in relation to climate change. 
 1. There has been a major increase in agricultural production and yields since the 1950s (FAO, 
2000). However, this productivity growth has changed one of the features of the very nature of 
agriculture. From being mostly an activity of production of food that relied on renewable energy 
sources—mainly the sun—agriculture increasingly became an economic activity producing food and 
increasingly non-food products in a way highly dependent on fossil fuels. In the long run, this 
dependence on exhaustible energy sources is a threat for the future supply of food for the world’s 
population. Technological change in agriculture has implied widespread application of synthetic 
fertilizers, high-yield varieties and farming systems of large-scale, all of which have led many 
authors and institutions to question the sustainability of modern agriculture (Gliesmann, 1990; 
Pimentel and Pimentel, 1996; Altieri, 2000). From the point of view of energy balances, it is para-
doxical that organic or traditional agriculture is more energy-efficient than modern agricultural 
production (Pimentel, 1992, 2005; Carpintero and Naredo, 2006). 
 2. Something similar applies to livestock production. Industrial farming based on concentrated 
animal-feeding operations has led to increased demand of feed grain, which in many developing 
countries has been the reason for increasing deforestation to expand the cultivation of animal feed, 
which is generally exported to developed countries.7 Cattle in solitary confinement no longer pas-
ture and crops of feed grain require major inputs of fossil energy (for producing fertilizers, using 
machinery, etc..), inducing GHG emissions; the consequences are an increase in energy inefficiency 
in obtaining food from the trophic chain, and an increased contribution to climate change. Com-
pared with vegetables and grains, meat is a very energy-inefficient (and unhealthy beyond given 
thresholds) product as human food, and, as mentioned, its production strongly generates GHG 
emissions. Since the 1990s, investigations of the economic and environmental aspects of livestock 
production have originated many interesting analyses of the ecological consequences associated 
with different feeding models and patterns of consumption (Pimentel et al., 1973, Pimentel and 
Pimentel, 1979; Brown and Kane, 1994; Kendal and Pimentel, 1994, Goodland, 1997, Bouma et al., 
1998; White, 2000; Seidl, 2000; Gerbens-Leenes, Nonhebel, Ivens, 2002; Gerbens-Leenes, Nonhe-
bel, 2002). For instance, since the cattle no longer pasture and need more and more grain and 
                                                 
7 A typical example is soybean production in Argentina that according to FAO increased between 1980 and 2010 from 3.5 to 62.7 
million tons, with the area dedicated to the crop expanding from 2 to 18 million hectares (faostat.fao.org). It has been also estimated 
that 16 million hectares of forest had been lost to soybean production; 95% of the soy presently produced is genetically modified. 
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forage crops, a human meat diet requires at present about three times more cultivated land than a 
vegetarian one (Penning de Vries, 1995). With meat content as in the average U.S. diet, the present 
agricultural world production would be able to feed about 2.5 billion people, that is, about 1/3 of the 
people alive today. “This is why it is so important for the world to remain low down in the food 
chain, for those high to descend, and to discourage people from moving up” (Goodland, 1997, p. 
191). For these and other reasons, the sustainability of intensive livestock production model has 
been questioned (FAO, 2010). 
 3. During the past two decades, an expansion of international trade in agricultural products has 
occurred as part of a process of consolidation of a globalized agricultural model (Delgado, 2011). As 
part of this process, food imports have grown dramatically in many countries that formerly im-
ported little or no food. For example, in Asia, food imports increased 75% between 2000 and 2010 
(FAO, 2011). Imports of grain to poor countries increasingly threaten peasant farming and raise the 
vulnerability of rural communities, compromising their food security. On the other hand, this trade 
is associated with a significant generation of GHGs in long-distance transportation. 
 4. Finally, it shall be noted as a major aspect of the present intensive agricultural system the 
high degree of concentration in agricultural markets of both products and inputs. For instance, the 
10 largest companies that provide agricultural inputs sell 67% of commercial seed, 63% of livestock 
medicines, and 89% of agrochemicals (ETC Group, 2008). The oligopolistic nature of the world food 
market strengthens the incentives for the consolidation of the intensive farming model. It is thus a 
major obstacle to be overcome if agriculture is going to transform in a direction consistent with 
mitigation of climate change. 
 Agriculture impacts global warming through GHG emissions in two ways. On one hand, there 
are direct emissions of GHG related to agricultural activity. CH4 emissions result from digestive 
processes of livestock, rice cultivation by flooding, or stored manure; NO2 emissions come from the 
use of nitrogen fertilizers; CO2 results mainly from the degradation of organic matter by burning 
crop residues, manure application, and aggressive tillage practices (IPCC, 2001). These emissions 
amounted in recent years to 10% to 12% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions, or 5.1 to 6.1 Gt CO2-
eq annually; of these 6.1 Gt CO2-eq, about 3.3 would be attributable to CH4 while NO2 would con-
tribute 2.8 Gt CO2-eq (Smith et al., 2007). Direct emissions of CO2 from agriculture are less impor-
tant because, in general, exchanges of CO2 from agricultural land to the atmosphere are approxi-
mately balanced by the capture of CO2 by growing plants, and the net flux is small.  
 Things are very different regarding indirect emissions of GHG from agriculture. These include 
emissions from land use change, when natural ecosystems (forests, wetlands, etc.) are transformed 
into cultivated land. The IPCC (2000) estimated these indirect emissions to amount during 1986-
1998 to 5.8 + 2.9 Gt CO2-eq per year. Houghton (2008) also suggested a total global flux of 5.8 Gt 
CO2-eq/year during the 1990s, and 5.4 Gt CO2-eq/year during the first half of the past decade.  
 Considering these estimates, it seems the indirect emissions of GHG because of land conversion 
to agriculture are similar in magnitude to the direct emissions. The sum of direct and indirect 
emissions would thus represent annually about a fourth, 24%, of GHG global emissions. It should 
be noted that the distribution of these emissions is very uneven, with 74% of agricultural GHG 
emissions coming from low-income countries (Smith et al., 2007, p. 503).  
 Global warming is affected by agricultural activity, but, of course, global warming is also affect-
ing agriculture. Among the most important effects considered (IPCC, 2007b) are the following: (1) 
decreased yields in warmer environments, and increased yields in colder ones because of longer 
growing season and CO2 fertilization. Regarding the latter, recent research has indicated that 
ground level ozone emissions generated in the same combustion that emits CO2 could offset the 
positive impact of longer growing seasons and CO2 fertilization, and even it might cause a small net 
reduction in agricultural productivity (Reilly et al., 2007, cited by Ackerman, 2009, p. 306); (2) 
increased insect outbreaks; (3) increased evapotranspiration and greater risk of wildfires; (4) crop 
damage, erosion and land degradation, with the consequence of lower yields, and increased live-
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stock mortality; (5) deterioration of water quality (salinity of irrigation water) and quantity (in-
creased scarcity caused by reduced rainfall and more frequent droughts). 
 The Fourth Report of the IPCC (2007a) proposed a series of mitigation measures for agriculture 
that could achieve considerable potential GHG reduction by 2030 (Table 3) under different carbon 
price assumptions (Smith et al., 2007, p. 515). Measures and policies proposed to achieve this 
reduction (many of which are analyzed in other chapters of this book) include crop management 
(nutrient, tillage and residue management), management of organic soils, restored degraded lands, 
livestock grazing, land management, pasture improvement, and manure management. But as noted 
by Smith et al. (2007, p. 499), the key to success lies in soil carbon sequestration: “Soil carbon 
sequestration (enhanced sinks) is the mechanism for most of the mitigation potential, with an 
estimated 89% contribution to technical potential. Mitigation of CH4 emissions and N2O emissions 
from soils account for 9% and 2%, respectively, of the total mitigation potential.” However, total 
emissions of GHG from soil loss on account of erosion caused by intensive farming worldwide are 
very concerning (Lal, 2004; Lal, et al., 2004). 
 There are ways as the aforementioned ones to restore soil carbon and improve food production 
and conservation of agro-ecosystems. Indeed, a low-carbon (organic) agriculture has features that 
contribute to mitigating climate change and improving food system sustainability. As explained by 
Nigli et al. (2009, p. 2). organic agriculture “strongly reduces the reliance on external inputs by (i) 
recycling wastes as nutrient source; (ii) using nitrogen-fixing plants; (iii) improving cropping 
systems and landscapes; (iv) avoiding synthetic pesticides; and (v ) integrating crops and animals 
into a single farm production sector and including grass clover leys for fodder production, while 
avoiding purchase of feed concentrates.”  
 The task of conserving and increasing the carbon content of soils implies modifying practices of 
intensive agriculture that are already ingrained, and showing that it is not only desirable but also 
possible to move towards agroecology, or low-carbon agriculture (Gliesmann, 1990; Altieri, 2002;  




Seven years ago, several national academies asserted in a joint statement that the scientific under-
standing of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action (National 
Academies, 2005). However, dozens of international meetings and hundreds of hours of discussion 
later have only yielded ineffective agreements and an increasing inability of intergovernmental 
bodies to put in place policies that contribute to the “substantial and long-term reduction in global 
GHG emissions” that was requested by the national academies. In the meanwhile, emissions have 
continued to rise, even at faster rates, responding to the fluctuations of the global economy rather 
than to the half-hearted policies enacted in some countries to curb them. 
 Since the 1990s, there has been a long-standing debate about which environmental policy is best 
to combat climate change. Emission permits trading and the implementation of a carbon tax are the 
major options in the public debate (Hansen, 2009; Krugman, 2009). At present, there is some 
experience on emission permits trading since the European Trading Scheme was implemented in 
the European Union in 2005.  
 The European Trading Scheme has yielded very poor results and has been seen as plagued by 
problems of theoretical design (Spash, 2010; Aldy and Stavins, 2011; Corporate Europe Observa-
tory, 2011). The scheme has failed to reduce emissions and the emissions market is at present 
virtually inactive, with a price of emissions at almost zero. Because of this "oversupply," there is no 
incentive to reduce the emissions of CO2 by companies. The granting of free emission permits to the 
industry, when the scheme was implemented in 2005, allowed some companies to sell later the 
permits that they had received gratis during the first years, obtaining significant windfall profits in 
the process. At any rate, the global economic crisis that started in 2007 and is still going on or even 
worsening in Europe, has reduced industrial activity and the "excess emissions" unused have 
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generated this oversupply, leading the price per ton of CO2 to plummet, so that, presently, there is 
no incentive for emitters to adopt strategies to reduce CO2 emissions. 
 The theoretical shortcomings and poor results of trading of emission permits enhance the 
position of those who propose a carbon tax as the main tool to fight global climate change. This tax 
would be a key element of a green tax reform because it would reduce emissions by discouraging 
consumption of “carbon-rich” commodities and therefore promoting recycling, reuse and innova-
tion toward production and consumption of “carbon-poor” commodities. Such as proposed, for 
instance, by Hansen (2009), the carbon tax would be fiscally neutral, so that would be 100% re-
turned to the public on a per capita basis. Other proponents of the carbon tax see it as a means to 
obtain resources required to finance the ecological transformation of industrial society, or to im-
prove the fairness of the overall tax burden. At any rate, there have been only some timid steps in 
Australia, in the European Union and in Scandinavian countries toward the implementation of a 
carbon tax (Andersen and Ekins, 2009; Bakker, 2009). But the business community is strongly 
opposed to it and in the USA, even schemes for permits trading are considered out of question by 
most decision-makers. Climate change deniers are still common in public debates and many politi-
cians, business leaders and other “leaders of opinion” continue pointing to supposed inconsistencies 
of the science of global warming and to the lack of agreement among scientists with expertise on the 
issue. But, why is it so? 
 Energy inputs and therefore CO2 emissions are almost constantly implied by economic activities 
that generate monetary value, and such activities are the core of the working of our economic 
system. As economist Wesley C. Mitchell once explained, activity in a modern money economy is 
immediately aimed and guided, not by the quest of satisfactions or satisfaction of needs, but by the 
quest of profits, so that the major thrust of entrepreneurial activity is the money gain (Mitchell, 
1913, p. 21-22). Though many of the economic activities presently demanded by consumers are 
possible with a considerable restriction of emissions, there are implied reductions in profit that the 
affected businesses will oppose as much as possible. But emissions of CO2 are implied indirectly by 
many business activities and, furthermore, oil, coal, and car manufacturing industries—that benefit 
from products directly contributing to global warming—form a powerful lobby of corporations and 
national governments. For these reasons, effective policies to curb emissions have faced once and 
again insurmountable obstacles.  
 Perhaps a lesson can be learned from the fight of civil society and public health professionals 
worldwide against the marketing of tobacco products. This fight had to push the health interest of a 
diffuse public against the concrete interests of tobacco growers, cigarette manufacturers and even 
governments obtaining tax revenues from tobacco sales (Christoffel and Christoffel, 1989). The 
scientific community and the public heath advocates had to overcome major campaigns of tobacco 
manufacturers to deny either the science showing the harmful effects of smoking or the right of 
society to regulate sales of an addictive drug. Even now, tobacco manufacturers are still powerful 
enough to promote legally and sell their addictive drugs without restriction in many countries. But 
cigarettes are just one product, while policies for regulating emissions would affect directly hun-
dreds of commodities and, indirectly, almost all of them. That explains why curbing emissions 
meets almost insurmountable obstacles. However, in the same way a ‘healthy smoker’ is an oxymo-
ron, a sustainable society is incompatible with the present dynamics that are changing our atmos-
phere and the global climate. 
 We are writing this chapter during a summer of global news of extremely hot temperatures, in 
which 80% of the USA is abnormally dry, with a drought which according to the National Climatic 
Data Center is the worst in 56 years. June 2012 was the 10th driest June on record going back to 
1895 (Associated Press, 2012). Damaging wildfires are all around and crops, pastures and rangeland 
have deteriorated at an alarming rate. 
 In our opinion, to keep climate change from reaching levels implying irreversible consequences 
for both humanity and nature is a key undertaking for the following decades; it is probably of no less 
significance than preventing a third world war. Whether or not advancing toward that goal is 
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possible under the present economic and political conditions, only time will tell. For the scientific 
community, the task at hand is to show how things are. Under the tenets of democracy, it is for the 
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Table 1. Correlations (r) 
in different periods be-
tween GDP growth and 
the annual rate of growth 
of CO2 emissions in the 
United States  














Computed by the authors from 
data in CDIAC (2009) and 




Table 2. Some estimates of welfare impacts of climate change, as equivalents of an 
income change measured as percent change of GDP  















Nordhaus 1994a 3.0 -1.3     
Nordhaus 1994b 3.0 -4.8     
Fankhauser 1995 2.5 -1.4 -4.7 China -0.7 Eastern 
Europe & the 
former USSR 
Tol 1995 2.5 -1.9 -8.7 Africa -0.3 Eastern 
Europe & the 
former USSR 
Nordhaus & Yang 
1996 
2.5 -1.7 -2.1 Developing 
countries 
0.9 Former USSR 
Nordhaus & 
Boyer 2000 
2.5 -1.5 -3.9 Africa 0.7 Russia 
Tol 2002 1.0 2.3 -4.1 Africa 3.7 Western 
Europe 
Hope 2006 2.5 0.9 -2.6 Asia (s/o 
China) 
0.3 Eastern 









Source: Adapted from Tol (2009). Estimation details in source reference. 
 
 
Table 3. Selected examples of mitigation technologies, policies and measures. Technologies 




Mitigation technologies and practices currently 
commercially available 
Policies, measures and in-
struments shown to be envi-
ronmentally effective 





Improved supply and distribution efficiency; 
fuel switching from coal to gas; nuclear power; 
renewable heat and power (hydropower, solar, 
wind, geothermal and bioenergy); combined 
heat and power; early applications of CO2 cap-
ture and storage (CCS) (e.g. storage of removed 
CO2 from natural gas); CCS for gas, biomass 
and coal-fired electricity generating facilities; 
advanced nuclear power; advanced renewable 
energy, including tidal and wave energy, con-
centrating solar, and solar photovoltaics. 
Reduction of fossil fuel sub-
sidies; taxes or carbon 
charges on fossil fuels  
 
Feed-in tariffs for renewable 
energy technologies; renew-
able energy obligations; pro-
ducer subsidies 
< $20:                1.9  
 
$20 to $50:      1.4 
 
$50-100:         0.35  
 
 
Transport  More fuel-efficient vehicles; hybrid vehicles; 
cleaner diesel vehicles; biofuels; modal shifts 
from road transport to rail and public transport 
systems; non-motorized transport (cycling, 
walking); land-use and transport planning; sec-
ond generation biofuels; higher efficiency air-
craft; advanced electric and hybrid vehicles 
with more powerful and reliable batteries. 
Mandatory fuel economy; 
biofuel blending and CO2 
standards for road transport. 
Taxes on vehicle purchase, 
registration, use and motor 
fuels; road and parking pric-
ing.  
Influence mobility needs 
through land-use regulations 
and infrastructure planning; 
investment in attractive pub-
lic transport facilities and 
non-motorized forms of 
transport 
< $20:          1.75 
 
$20 to $50:    0.15 
 
50 to 100:        0.15 
 
Buildings  Efficient lighting and daylighting; more efficient 
electrical appliances and heating and cooling 
devices; improved cook stoves, improved insula-
tion; passive and active solar design for heating 
and cooling; alternative refrigeration fluids, 
recovery and recycling of fluorinated gases; in-
tegrated design of commercial buildings in-
cluding technologies, such as intelligent meters 
that provide feedback and control; solar photo-
voltaics integrated in buildings 
Appliance standards and 
labeling  




Public sector leadership pro-
grams, including procure-
ment incentives for energy 
service companies 
< $20:          5.5b 
 
$20 to 100:      0.6 
 
Industry  More efficient end-use electrical equipment; 
heat and power recovery; material recycling and 
substitution; control of non-CO2 gas emissions; 
and a wide array of process-specific technolo-
gies; advanced energy efficiency; CCS for ce-
ment, ammonia, and iron manufacture; inert 
electrodes for aluminum manufacture 
Provision of benchmark in-
formation; performance 




<$20:           1.1 
$20 to $50:     2.4 




Improved crop and grazing land management to 
increase soil carbon storage; restoration of cul-
tivated peaty soils and degraded lands; im-
proved rice cultivation techniques and livestock 
and manure management to reduce CH4 emis-
sions; improved nitrogen fertilizer application 
techniques to reduce N2O emissions; dedicated 
energy crops to replace fossil fuel use; improved 
energy efficiency; improvements of crop yields 
Financial incentives and 
regulations for improved 
land management; maintain-
ing soil carbon content; effi-
cient use of fertilizers and 
irrigation 
<$20:           1.6 
 
$20 to $50:     1.1 
 





Afforestation; reforestation; forest manage-
ment; reduced deforestation; harvested wood 
product management; use of forestry products 
for bioenergy to replace fossil fuel use; tree spe-
cies improvement to increase biomass produc-
tivity and carbon sequestration; improved re-
mote sensing technologies for analysis of 
vegetation/soil carbon sequestration potential 
and mapping land-use change. 
Financial incentives (na-
tional and international) to 
increase forest area, to re-
duce deforestation and to 
maintain and manage for-
ests; land-use regulation and 
enforcement. 
< $20:          1.25 
 
$20 to $50:    0.90 
 
$50 to 100:    0.65 
 
Waste  Landfill CH4 recovery; waste incineration with 
energy recovery; composting of organic waste; 
controlled wastewater treatment; recycling and 
waste minimization; biocovers and biofilters to 
optimize CH4 oxidation 
Financial incentives for im-
proved waste and wastewater 
management Renewable 




<$20:         0.58 
$20 to $50:   0.10 
$50 to 100:    0.04 
a Estimates of potential reduction of emissions, in Gt CO2-eq per year, for three different levels of price (in 
U.S. dollars) of one ton of CO2. Estimates are for 2030 and obtained from bottom-up studies.  
b Most of this 5.5 would be the result of improvements at no cost that therefore would produce some net 
monetary benefits.   
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2007, p. 60) and Baker et al. (2007) 
 
Figure 1. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (monthly average) as measured in air samples collected at Mauna Loa, Hawaii (Keeling 
curve) from February 1958 to February 2012. Units are parts per million by volume. Preindustrial concentrations, estimated at levels be-
tween 200 and 300 ppm, would be far out of the graph   
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Fig 2 (cont.). Per capita annual emissions of CO2  plotted versus GDP per capita, 1960-2006 (except for USA as indicated) 
 
 
Notes and sources: Authors’ elaboration from CO2 emission data from CDIAC and Word Bank GDP data for all countries in the figure except for the USSR (GDP data from 
Maddison) and the United States (GDP data from Carter et al.’s Historical Statistics of the United States). The countries included are those pertaining to the expanded G-
20, which includes 20 “major” economies (19 countries, plus the European Union, EU) that together account for 85% of world GDP. Neither the Netherlands nor Spain are 
members of this group except through their membership in the EU, but they have been special guests to some of their meetings; for that reason are included here. USSR 
data are for the years before the USSR disappeared, i. e., until 1991. 
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Figure 3. Annual growth of world GDP (gray line, trillions of 2000 US dollars), and annual change of estimated CO2 emissions (millions of 




Sources: World GDP from the World Development Indicators database (data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators) of the World Bank. The same 
source provided figures of estimated global emissions of CO2 (million Kt) for the years 1961-2008. Data on CO2 emissions for 2009 and 2010 were computed from pre-
liminary estimates of carbon emissions obtained from CDIAC (cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/perlim_2009_2010_estimates.html) in March 2012. To transform carbon 
emissions into CO2 emissions the factor 3.67 was used. 
 
 
 
